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Abstract 
Stakeholder management has for the last three decades been concerned either with 
strategic business management or business ethics, values and quality. Many models have 
been developed, but recently the literature asks for more dynamic models instead of the 
staticism that characterizes some models. This paper offers an ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ 
based on decision making theory, risk assessment and adaption to a rapidly changing 
world combined with appropriate stakeholder theory for ethical purposes in decision 
making processes in businesses. The ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ is based on empirical 
evidence from hybrid organizations as Publicly Owned Enterprises (POEs) mixed of private 
corporations and political administration. The model offers a new way of combining risk 
management with ethical decisionmaking processes by the inclusion of multiple 
stakeholders. Not only does the model apply to these kinds of hybrid organizations, but it is 
easily adopted and tested for other private business models too. The findings and the 
conceptualization of the model enhances business ethics in decision making by managing 
and balancing stakeholder concerns with the same concerns as the traditional risk 
management models does – for the sake of the wider social responsibilities of the 
businesses and its stakeholders. 
Keywords: Stakeholder Management, Organic Systems, Business Ethics, Decision Making 
and ‘Time’/’Cost’ variables. 
Introduction 
Stakeholder theory has been arguing for the betterness of the world and the 
applicability of business ethics, moral values and qualities for more than three decades 
since the coined terms of R. Edward Freeman in 1984, Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach (Freeman 1984). A vast literature of many theoretical and 
 2 
empirical analyzes have been done and conceptualizing theories supporting the very 
first theory of Freeman for researchers to understand what stakeholder theory is all 
about and normatively what it has to be concerned about in practice of managers in all 
kinds of businesses and administrations of organizations. This paper is designed to 
contribute to this literature in designing a model meeting the needs of stakeholder 
management theories to adapt to a more organic view of stakeholder management and 
to overcome the staticity of stakeholder models (Fassin 2010) in order to meet the 
complexities and irrationalities of the world and business arenas we deal with in 
organizations when dealing with multiple stakeholders. First, the paper reviews very 
shortly the most relevant stakeholder theory and -models supporting the proposed 
model, and thereafter presents ideas of the literature of organic versus mechanistic 
structures in organization (Burns and Stalker 1961) as well as the ideas of risk 
management and decision making in complex organizations with multiple actors and 
stakeholders (March 1994) – more precisely the ‘Garbage Can’ model of decision making 
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). From these theoretical insights from Burns and 
Stalker’s especially ’organic’ structures (Burns and Stalker 1961) combined with Cohen 
et al.’s ‘Garbage Can’ model of decision making (Cohen et al. 1972) and March ideas of 
organizational theory (March 1994) combined I derive my ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ 
assessed with March’s risk management – in this context stakeholder risks assessment – 
and not the classical – risk management seen from the perspective of the business itself 
and how businesses can elaborate their stakeholder relationships and stakeholder 
management, but seen from the stakeholder perspective. This implicates, that the model 
initially reverses the objectives for stakeholder management in the traditional way, and 
instead takes the view of ‘the other’ – as George Herbert Mead put it (Cook 1993) – and 
tries to view risk management from the viewpoint of the stakeholders in order to 
accomplish decision making, that reduces risks for stakeholders and eventually for the 
business itself. Risks are sometimes seen by rational decision makers as something that 
we should “do-away” with (March 1994) which sometimes is impossible – then, when 
reversing the viewpoint of ‘for whom’ and ‘what’ are businesses operating, by seeing 
risk management as ‘for stakeholders’ and implicitly ‘for us’ the management of risks 
reveals more knowledge about uncertainties just by stretching the network of knowers 
by including stakeholders in the process of decision making. As March points out – it is 
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impossible to know everything relevant prior to decision making, and irrationalities are 
certain kinds of unmanageable entities as well as knowledge-consumption that is 
cognitively limited by the participants in the known setting – so when trying to reduce 
risks that we know of either by experiences of our self or of others, we still have a range 
of unknowable risks, that we experience only by the outcomes of decision making – 
meaning retrospectively (March 1994, Weick 1995). So what do managers do? They 
enhance knowledgeability, they bring in more and more knowledge in order to 
‘rationally’ reduce risks and uncertainties till the point where cognitive limits of 
information capabilities reaches a point where known knowledge is no longer used, 
experiences are forgotten and rational choices can become irrational in the aftermath of 
sensemaking of the outcome of the decision making (March 1994). We only know if we 
made a good decision after we have implemented it – as Weick says: “How do I know 
what I think till I see what I say?” (Weick 1979). No risk model has yet proven to be “safe” 
enough. We can only learn and learn by others in order to be able by our limited 
rationality to ‘estimate’ rational choices without lulling ourselves into the idea of risk-
avoidance and risk-elimination, March points out (March 1994). And this involves risk-
taking. 
Choosing this deliberate view of the stakeholder involves the environment or society in 
risk management of business decisionmaking. I will show from the empirical evidence, 
which comes after the theoretical review, that this ’ethical turn’ can create a business 
case with mutual benefits that promotes and assists the decision maker even more than 
classical risk management seen from a self-fulfillment perspective eventually. It cannot 
eliminate risks and it cannot “do-away” with uncertainties. But it will build a consensus 
of prioritizing risks in a broader view and eventually reduce the risk-taking of both 
businesses and stakeholders. From here I draw analytically conceptual points to build 
the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ and show how stakeholder risk management for ethical 
decision making can deliver a business case out of business ethics or corporate social 
responsibilities, which mutually consists of certain amounts of philanthropy and 
altruism combined with mutual benefits for both the environment and businesses – a 
socalled durable model (Aras and Crowther 2009). The methodology of the research and 
the becoming of the model are described in the next. 
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Methodology 
The ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ is inducted by participant-observations done in hybrid 
organizations of Danish water companies from 2004 – 2011, where I was working first 
as a practitioner from 2004 -2010 and afterwards conducted ongoing and retrospective 
research in my prior projects and ongoing case-studies I observed (as an outsider) in 
respectively a large and medium-sized water company. The projects in which 
stakeholder involvement was intense and multi-perspective contained following 
construction projects: 
Project name and locality Project description Project type 
1) Stormwater pipe basin in 
Odense Habour  
3 km pipeline basin of 11,000 m3 water 
installed under a protected and 300 years old 
cultural heritage forest to reduce 
contaminations through discharges to scarce 
water bodies 
Mega-project 
with multiple 
stakeholders 
2) Stormwater pipe basin in 
Dalum/Odense 
1,5 km pipeline basin of 4,000 m3 water 
installed under a protected forest to reduce 
contaminations through discharges to a 
protected river 
Mega-project 
with multiple 
stakeholders 
3) Stormwater basin in 
Sanderum/Odense 
A natural stormwater basin installed in an 
urban area where repeatedly overflow of 
stormwater destroyed 9 houses under extreme 
rain events. 7 out of 9 houses were bought and 
removed for the optimal replacement of the 
stormwater basin 
Controversial 
project. Happy 
ending of a 
seemingly 
unsolvable 
problem by 
untraditional but 
legal methods  
4) Energy/additives reduction in 
WWTPs in Svendborg 
Implementation of a new IT-system of online-
measuring in 3 wastewater treatment plants 
(WWTP) for energy- and additive reduction 
and total rearrangements of control-systems to 
operate the WWTPs 
Change-project. 
The adaption of a 
new operation 
style. 
5) Energy reduction of 
distribution of freshwater in 
Svendborg 
Experimental project of reducing pressures in 
freshwater pipelines and pumping stations for 
better and more consistent water delivery and 
energy-efficient outcome 
Experimental 
project with a 
surprising 
outcome. 
6) Construction of a new 500 m2 
building in Svendborg 
A traditionally construction of a building but 
inclusion of a total substitution of fossile 
energy for “green energy” – a project that had 
strong evidence of sustainability but also the 
traditionally building failures resulting in a 
stakeholder riot before problems were solved. 
Controversial 
project. 
A success with 
many failures 
and stakeholder 
riots during the 
process. 
Tabel 1 
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The above projects in Tabel 1 are described in detail in the chapter of empirical evidence 
as are the concepts and categories for the projects (mega-projects, controversial, 
experimental and change). 
The research methodology used in the above case studies was made as qualitative 
studies of participant observations, interviews and document studies during and ex post 
the realization of the projects. My role as participant observer was in all cases except 
from case 5) to be one out of several decision makers, which gave me the opportunity to 
observe while negotiating with other managers such as top managers, project managers, 
employees and various outside-organization stakeholders such as regulators, 
authorities, neighbours, unions, property owners, land owners, NGOs, shopkeepers, 
advocates, schools, road users, workers, citizens and many more. The cases no. 1) – 2) 
had multiple (> 100) stakeholders while stakeholders in case 3), 4) and 5) were limited 
but very intense, but in case 6) I had the experience to be a project manager among 
several (> 50) and nearby stakeholders of the organization of the water company, who 
ordered the building sitting in the same office of those stakeholders, since they were my 
colleagues and chiefs executives. This project were the first project, I had as project 
manager, where the majority of stakeholders constantly (meaning every day) claimed 
legitimacy for their claim during the whole construction period in contrast to the other 
projects, where stakeholders were more absent and only present from time to time in 
times of relevance. Case 5) had some of the same features since all stakeholders were 
the employees and the operation manager – all my collegues, though they were 
physically present in another building than the one, I was working from. Here, my role 
was substituted with the operation manager, who during the project of installation of a 
new IT-system had to rearrange all operations at the 3 wastewater treatment plants 
while he was surrounded with a majority of stakeholders – his employees. 
The observations and documentation of all projects contains a vast amount of 
documents consisting of written emails, reports, minutes, press material, books and 
videos and written notes, - in some of the cases thousands of pages - while interviews 
have been few and limited to only case 4) and 5), where I made in-depth interviews with 
the operation manager and project managers in charge of these projects. On the basis of 
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this the assumptions of conceptualization the ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ will be 
proposed. 
The qualitative work of mine takes its departure in a constructivist paradigm on the 
basis of symbolic interactionism from a viewpoint of how humans make sense of 
decisiomaking and understands the meaning of it retrospectively ex post 
situationalization (Weick 1995).  This perspective is more elaborated in the chapter of 
theory and combines very well with the chosen perspectives of both ‘organic structures’ 
(Burns and Stalker 1961) as well as the theory of limited rationality and the ‘garbage 
can’ model of decision making (Cohen et al 1972) and risk-management (March 1994). 
Before continuing to the theoretical review and conceptualization, I will dedicate a small 
amount of the story to the contextual setting of the hybrid organizations of Danish water 
companies. 
Organization setting 
The organizational setting of the hybrid organizations of Danish water companies is 
mixed of the settings of private companies and public administrations. In this term 
‘hybrid’ should be understood in the organizational structure, which is explained next. 
The structure of the hybrid organizations has deep connections to the privatization of 
public service administration, that has taken place more or less world wide. In this 
respect, the structure of hybrid organization of publicly owned enterprises (POEs) looks 
a lot like we know the structures from state owned enterprises (Lauesen 2011). The 
Danish water companies are constructed as a private limited liability and the 
municipality solely holds all shares in these specific cases. Some state owned enterprises 
have been privatized fully and been listed on the stock exchanges, and the shares that 
the state owns varies from company to company. This is not the case in the POEs of the 
water companies in Denmark. The company shares are not listed but formally owned by 
the municipality. In many companies the board members and the Chairman are typically 
held by local politicians pointed out by the City Council (Lauesen 2011). Since the 
companies core activities has not changed, and the municipality eventually is 
responsible for the delivery of water and wastewater services, the hybrid of former 
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public administration perpetuates the companies activities at the same time as the 
managerial ‘freedom to act’ has changed the decision-making paths. Decisions have been 
translated into the New Public Management system of ‘limited freedom’ surrounded by 
a vast amount of new legislational acts and a new regime of regulation according to the 
Water Sector Law. But inside the law and regulation – which yields both juridically and 
economic limitations – the managerial ‘freedom-to-act’ is present, and from here the 
structure is very similar to private businesses. We will see from the chosen cases 
examples of how this hybrid structure of POEs forms a new kind of ethical decision 
making – mainly from the way that these organizations are constructed, the limitations 
of ‘freedom-to-act’ and inside this ‘blackbox’ (Latour and Woolgar 1986), how social, 
environmental and ethical concerns formally and informally thrives. 
Literature review of stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory was originally developed in connection to strategic management, but 
have increasing become a matter of how to assess business ethics into actions of social 
matters. The “father” of stakeholder-theory R. E. Freeman (1984) (Crane & Matten 
2007) has made modern management emphasize the importance of investing in the 
relationships with those, who have a stake in the firm. He has inspired stakeholder 
theorists ever since to either supplement his model (e.g. Donaldson & Preston 1995), 
develop it (Mitchell et al. (1997); Wartick & Wood (1998); Wood et al. 2008; Fassin 
2009) or make new stakeholder concepts and -perspectives (Rowley 1997; Jensen 
2002).  
Mitchell et al. (1997) as well as Wartick & Wood (1998) brings in the importance of 
‘power’ in relation to stakeholders and how much stakeholders matter to the 
Freemanian stakeholder theory. They perceive that the importance or salience of the 
stakeholders depends on; Power, Legitimacy and Urgency. Stakeholders are holding 
three types of powers (Wartick & Wood 1998): Formal (shareholders, directors), 
economic (employees, customers, suppliers, creditors) and political power (pressure 
groups, activists, governments and the community)(cited in King 2000). Wartick & 
Wood recognize that some stakeholders have multiple power bases (King 2000), which 
is also seen in the case of key stakeholders in POEs (Lauesen 2011). 
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Fassin (2009) modernizes the Freemanian Stakeholder-models (Freeman 1984; Mitchell 
et al. 1997, Wartick & Wood 1998) and calls his innovative model a “Stake Model”. He 
defines three types of stakes: The stakeholder who holds a stake (i.e. stockholder, 
owner), the stakewatcher who watches the stake (i.e. pressure groups) and the 
stakekeeper (i.e. regulators) who keeps the stake (Fassin 2009). This stakeholder-
approach to CSR has some special benefits compared to the traditional stakeholder-
models standing alone: 1) It (still) contains the typology of Mitchell et al. (1997)-
definition of the stakeholder (Power, Legitimacy and Urgency as well as three types of 
power; Formal, Economical and Political power) but in a new mix that accepts 
stakeholders having different roles and not always as “real stakes”, i.e. regulatory 
control (Fassin 2009). 2) It acknowledges the Freemanian cognitive power between 
stakeholders that binds them together (Fassin 2009). 
Fassin sketches his model, which is - like Rowley’s (1997) - inspired of social network 
analysis (SNA), but – unlike Rowley – illustrated not only by ties (relationships) and 
knots (actors) (Freeman 2006) but also by circles interacting in each other (Fassin 
2009). The left side is Fassin’s stakeholder-relation 3D-chart (Figure 1) and the right 
side is refined for the stakeholders of the firm seen in a 2D version (Figure 2):   
  
 
This model is illustrated visually with the traditionally SNA-parameters shown directly 
(actors, ties, connec-tions, closeness, bridges, centrality etc.) and thoroughly adapting 
Figure 1 Triangular relation ”solar system” 
(Fassin 2009) 
Figur 2 The Stake Model of Fassin (2009) 
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these parameters into a sketching instead of depending only on a traditional SNA-
linguistic explanational frame which claims for a discursive interpretation. This lies 
implicitly in the visuality of the model (Fassin 2009). Lately Fassin has commented his 
own model and asked for the necessity of the inclusion of a more dynamic view of 
stakeholder relationship, since the “(s)takeholder literature has acknowledged the need 
to complement the extant theory on stakeholder management by more dynamic 
perspectives” (Fassin 2010, p. 39). Fassin adresses this task by inclucing another 
category borrowed from Holzer (2008) supplementing his former categorization of 
stakeholder-types, namely the introduction of Holze’s definition of the stakeseekers who 
are characterized “by (the) role of ... various forms of activism, from shareholders, NGOs 
and government, in the stakeholder mobilisation process (and)... how stakewatchers and 
stakeseekers can profoundly affect stakeholder salience, especially in crises.” (Ibid.). 
Fassins conclude that the “activist salience increases in crises, when management’s 
decisions do not sufficiently take into consideration stakeholders interests” (Fassin 2010, p. 
48) and that this dynamism is clear by using graphical means to analyze stakeholder 
influence or -salience. The problem with single, static models are, that they 
counterstrike their own intentions, which Fassin shows by his various cases. A single 
model cannot predict dynamism in real life by using a static visual model anyway. The 
dynamic, that Fassin wants to show – and for that purpose it really needed a dynamic 
medium such as a flashing and moving medium such as a screen to be able to show it - 
how the model “moves” and what is meant by the dynamism, that he demands from his 
model. 
In the very same sense, Freeman (2010) have departured from the visualization of 
stakeholder relationships in their recap of the 1984 book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, which were revised in 2010. Freeman uses the proper language of 
the text that he presents, and wants to show in pure wording “who and what really 
counts” (Freeman 1984, 2010). To understand that complex matters, such as the 
examples of Fassin’s (2010) as well as in general (Freeman 2010), this paper 
acknowledges the various concepts addressed in this literature review, but tries to show 
from another angle how dynamism might be captured in and ‘organic’ way, that has the 
same limitations as Fassins (2010) model when illustrating in a ‘static’ text, but in the 
same sense as other theorists, it tries to compensate by claiming that the model offers 
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no static illustrative model that can encompass all or even similar cases, but it offers a 
mindset of the concept of ‘ethics’ addressed by Freeman (2010) but attached with two 
dependent variables, that determines the outcome of ‘ethics’ in decision making by the 
involvement of various stakeholders – determinant or others less determinant. 
Theory of ’Organic structures’ and ’Garbage Can’ decision-making. 
This theorybuilding for the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ involves ideas from Burns and 
Stalker’s definitions of ’organic structures’ in organizations (Burns and Stalker 1961) – a 
structure I will argue from the empirical evidence is present when dealing with 
stakeholders more than traditional ’mechanic structures’, which many stakeholder 
models assume. I will argue, that decision making in organizations are tied to 
stakeholder relationships in these types of hybrid organizations, and that these ideas 
can and will be used in many kinds of organizations – purposefully or unconsciously. In 
this respect I draw my ideas from Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) of their ’Garbage Can 
Model’ of decision making, and also the elaboration of these ideas as expressed by March 
in ’A Primer on Decision Making’ (March 1994), where he elaborates these ideas into 
organizational management in general. The basic of combining these ideas is not foreign 
for either of the theorists, since the glue of observations all have done is based on the 
way that Weick later on described as ’sensemaking’ (Weick 1995), which March also 
refers to and Burns and Stalker (1961) used unconsciously in their observations and 
interviews with actors in companies. I will shortly review the main features on the three 
theories before describing my ’Organic Stakeholder Model’, which is substantiated with 
these theoretical ideas. 
’Organic structures’ (Burns and Stalkers (1961) definitions) 
Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker (1961) did a study of 20 different industrial organizations 
finding themselves in an environment of continually change in both market situation 
and technical information and thereby struggling with tasks that constantly were new 
and unfamiliar, and how these organizations tried to stabilize this fuzzyness into 
operational and practiceable conditions (p. vii). They categorized and compared 
managerial systems as either ’mechanistic’ or ’organic’. With ’management’ is 
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understood ”directing, coordinationg and controling the operations of a working 
community” (p. 13). ’Mechanistic’ systems were found in traditional bureaucracies 
defined by the functions, methods, responsibilities and powers in a highly structured 
organization with clear boundaries such as vertical hierarchies, clear duties and 
procedures to proceede the task necessary (Ibid., Weber year). ’Organic’ systems were 
found in organizations and defined by interactions happening in both lateral and vertical 
levels in the organizational structure rather than vertical command systems as in the 
traditional bureaucracy (Burns and Stalker 1961, p. 5). ’Organic’ systems are as well as 
the bureaucracy ’stratified’, but not hierarchical in the same way (p. 122). Their 
conclusions were, that ’organic’ systems adapt better to unstable conditions (p. 11) 
because ”problems and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and 
distributed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy” (p. 8). ”The 
individuals have to perform their special tasks in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of 
the firm as a whole” (Ibid.) and knowledge to adapt to the changing conditions have to be 
sought and negotiated in all levels of the company in order for the company to survive in 
a competitive and rapidly changing environment (p. 11). Change is understood both 
related to the use of technology and the performance and interaction among individuals 
in the organizations. And in order to make changes both in choices of adaptive and most 
efficient technology for the tasks as well as the change in human interactions with each 
other and with the technology, the amount of knowledge and how this is found, decided 
applicable, implemented and stored as memory in these organizations is no longer 
hierarchical  determinant, but multilayered inside and outside the organizations. Burns 
and Stalker found that no single set of principle could be said to be of ’good organization’ 
or ’ideal type’ of management system or administrative practice generally, but 
that ’mechanistic’ systems are well adapted under stable conditions, where ’organic’ 
systems were best suited for the adaption to rapid environmental changes (p. viii + 11). 
The next question is, what is meant by ’unstable conditions’ or ’rapid environmental 
changes’?  Here, Burns and Stalker explains that the concept of ’novelty’ related to ’risk-
taking’ in order to ’reduce harm’ when ”an enormous numbers of random possibilities are 
eliminated by rational choice (which means that) the chances of harm rather than good 
resulting are reduced, not eliminated” (p. 21). In the same sense they find, that when 
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environments or conditions are rapidly changing ”the person or the organization is itself 
changing, so that even to maintain the same degree of fitness for survival, people and 
institutions may have to change their ways (so the) risks attendant upon change may have 
to be weighted against other risks arising from maintaining the same state of affairs” (p. 
21). This indicates, that the operation of an organic system of management is dependent 
on effective communication (p. 252) across departments, among individuals, workers, 
consumers, i.e. stakeholders in general and finally linked to the decisions made for these 
necessary changes at stake. 
’Garbage Can Model’ of decision making (Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) model) 
The ’organic’ management system, as Burns and Stalker (1961) describes it as the most 
adaptive management system for changing environments, leads us to examine how 
decisions are made under conditions that continually are changing in the way of 
everyday practice. For this purpose the ’Garbage Can Model’ explained by Michael D. 
Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1972) is very relevant. Cohen et al. describes 
organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid 
participation as ’organized anarchies’ and found by computer simulations of 324 
examples on how decisions are made in these fluxes of uncertainties with a metaphor 
like the ’garbage can’. These definitions will be presented in the next to understand 
exactly what is meant by the categories and the model of ’garbage can’ and how these 
ideas can be linked to the ’organic’ system of management explained earlier. 
The ’organized anarchy’ is not a definition, that Cohen et al. characterizes a whole 
institution or organization with, but any organization can be characterized as such ”in 
part – or part of the time” (p. 1). The process occurs precisely when the precondi- tions 
of more normal rational models are not met (p. 16). 
Cohen et al. defines the first premise ’problematic preferences’ as general for 
the ’anarchistic’ organization operating in changing environments, because no 
preferences are stable enough at any span of time from decision making to 
implementation or action upon the preferences. They argue that ”(t)he organization 
operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences. It can be 
described better as a loose collection of ideas than as a coherent structure; it discovers 
preferences throuch action more than it acts on the basis of preferences” (p. 1). The 
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second premise ’unclear technology’ is understood in a way that members of the 
organization exposed to changes does not fully understand the (new) technology it uses, 
and therefore it operates ”on simple trial-and-error procedures, the residue of learning 
from past experience, and pragmatic inventions of necessity” (Ibid.). Because how should 
individuals be able to consume the rapid changes of environment and technology when 
time is a limitation to knowledge and experience gathering, we could ask ourselves? If 
we acknowledge that knowledge-building takes time, and maybe technology has to 
change more rapidly than the consumption of knowledge about it – which we know 
from some IT-systems, where we did not get to use it very well before the system was 
changed to another novel system – the trial-and-error seems rapid enough to make us 
understand what we are to do about it if the risk of new changes are overhanging. The 
third premise is ’fluid participation’, which Cohen et al. defines as participants and their 
involvement and effort vary over time which makes the boundaries of the organization 
uncertain and changing, which also means, that decision makers and audience may 
change as rapidly as everybody else (p. 1).  
To premises, that also characterizes the ’anarchistic organization’ is ’goal ambiguity’ 
meaning ”the manner in which organizations make choices without consistent, shared 
goals” and ’actor attention’ meaning ” how occasional members become active and how 
attention is directed toward, or away from, a decision” which Cohen et al. finds in every 
complex organization (p. 1-2). The classical citation of the results of the decision making 
process in ’organizational anarchies’ speaks for itself, and this quote is one of the most 
used in decision making theory ever since its presentation (masser af referencer): 
“From this point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, 
issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for 
work.” (Cohen et al. 1972, p. 2) 
The above changes the focus of meaning of choices and how this changes over time (p. 
2). This emphasis of ’timing’ and ’time-pattern’ and linked with ’energy’, which I 
understand as how much ’quality’ and ’value’ for ’whom’ and ’what’, as Cohen et al. 
suggest will become crucial in decision making (Ibid.). The definition of the ’garbage can’ 
is a metaphor for and linked to the ’opportunities of choices’ in which different problems 
and solutions are mixed un-structured, found relevant and non-relevant, in the timing of 
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their appearance in the setting of time during the process, and loosely coupled by the 
attention of participants acting fluidly and non-coherent during the whole process of 
decision making (Ibid.). This makes organizational decision making dependent on 
a ”relatively complicated interplay among the generation of problems in an organization, 
the deployment of personnel, the production of solutions, and the opportunities for choice.” 
(p. 2). Cohen et al. defines the way decision making is done under these premises in four 
streams: A stream of 1) choices, 2) problems, 3) solutions and 4) energy allocated. All 
streams depends more or less on ’entry time’ (calender time), ’decision structure’ (who 
is allocate to make decisions), ’energy requirement’ (how difficult is it, how many 
ressources must we activate, what implications or harm is there) and ’access structure’ 
(a list of choices to which the problem can be assessed). These streams are tested in the 
computer simulation of 324 examples, which leads Cohen et al. following findings of 
decision making processes in ’organized anarchies’ in three ways: 
1) Resolution: Some choices solve some problems after an amount of time of 
working with them. 
2) Oversight: If new choices become available for problems, that may be connected 
to other choices, and this new choice limits the time and energy to solve the 
problem, it is chosen. 
3) Flight: A more attractive choice come along after some time working with the 
problem and other choices, then the problem leaves the other choices and 
attaches to the new one because of the appearant attractiveness of outcome. 
Cohen et al. then finds an interesting connection from their simulations. ’Resolution’ is 
not the most common decision making style, though many problems are sought to be 
solved in this manner from the beginning. ’Oversight’ and ’Flight’ are more common in 
the process in general (p. 9). The process is also found very sensitive to variations in 
energy-load. If energy-load is heavy, then problem activity and decision making activity 
are increased, and the decision making gets more difficult, which leads to the choice 
characterized from ’oversight’ and ’flight’ and much time is spent while problems are 
not solved thouroughly or eliminated entirely (Ibid.). Decision makers and problems 
tends to track each other through different choices, that does not eliminate the problem 
or solve it eventually. Attention is paid to the importance of problems and the timing of 
their entrance in such ways, that early problems are resolved more likely than late 
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problems. The queue of problems are typically made on the basis of importance. But in 
this respect, the importance of choices are not following the same feature: 
“Important choices are less likely to resolve problems than unimportant choices. Important 
choices are made by oversight and flight. Unimportant choices are made by resolution. 
These differences are observed under both of the choice entry sequences but are sharpest 
where important choices enter relatively early.” (Cohen et al. 1972 p. 11) 
The findings of Cohen et al. showing that problems are not typically resolved 
by ’resolution’, which could solve the problem and ”neutralize” it. In ’organized 
anarchies’ they found much more evidence for choices made by ’oversight’ and ’flight’, 
which were more ’important’ than the choices of ’resolution’, which were unimportant. 
Theses characteristica of ’organized anarchies’ opposed to more ’rational choices’ linked 
to the ’resolutionary’ choices made parallel in many organizations and many projects 
seems to support Burns and Stalkers ideas of better adaptability of ’organic’ 
management systems to changes in all levels of and by all issues found i modern, 
complex organizations having multiple stakeholder relationships facing multiple 
demands and claims to solve problems in organizations structures, that on the one hand 
may be both hierarchical (’mechanistic’) and open, while decision makers can be 
stratified across all levels in the hierarchy (’organic’). 
Burns and Stalker investigated industries and Cohen et al. investigated universities and 
public, politically administrations primarily. This combination of Burns and 
Stalkers ’organic’ system of management as a symbol of ’rational choices’ with 
the ’garbage can’ model as a symbol of ’anarchistic choices’ suits the hybrid 
organizations of Danish water companies who are structurally and organizationally 
mixed of the same types of both industrial and public administration, which makes 
the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ combine decision making from both ’rational’ 
(organicly adaptive to changes) and ’anarchistic’ features.      
The ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ (OSM) 
As we saw from the literature study of stakeholder theory, many models are limited in 
at ’static’ way of defining what R. Edward Freeman asked in the very first place ”who and 
what really counts” (Freeman 1984, 2010). While stakeholder theory in Freemans 
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version has an in-built ethical turn to face values of qualities as an outcome for the 
stakeholder relationship, I have explored through out my empirical setting how ethics 
are considered in the face-to-face meeting among decision makers and their 
stakeholders and how decisions are made primarily of ethical considerations combined 
with intended rationality of ’who and what really matters’. The ’static’-ness of 
stakeholder models whether they are visually made in diagrams or orally explained 
textually is in the first place linked to what we understand by a ’model’. 
My understanding of a ’model’ is that this term encapsulates a certain view of a complex 
phenomena knowing that this is not the fully explanation to everything contained in that 
complexity. We have seen how Mitchell et al. (1997) and Wartick and Wood (1998) 
offers a model of consistency in the academic literature saying that stakeholders can be 
characterized by their relevance in terms for power, legitimacy and urgency. This model 
has been referred to intensely, but it has the same possibilities and limitations as other 
models or ’views’ on the same phenomena. A model has a tendency to leave everything 
else out of the picture. Which the model, I will present also does, but in relation to 
the ’power, legitimacy and urgency’-model it does not act as a parsimony to that specific 
model nor to any other stakeholder models. It presents a view that can be combined 
with the other models presented in the literature review, because it poses the interest in 
other matters of the same phenomena regarded. The ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ wants 
to view the micro-processes of decision making and how this creates a pattern similar 
to ’organic’ systems of management while dealing with as well ’rational’ as ’irrational’ 
or ’anarchistic’ desion making processes. 
The model is purposefully left very simple. This idea may conflict with the complexities, 
it actually offers a viewpoint to, but to embrace complexity in organizations, in projects 
or issues and in decision making based on the realization, that decision makers has the 
cognitive limitations of comprehending large amounts of information, which is typically 
present in complex situations of decision making with the allocation of multiple actors, 
multiple decision makers and multiple stakeholders, very few indicators are necessary 
to explain how this ’limited rationality’ (March 1994) operates in practice, and therefore 
in my model I want to show how ’ethics’ in decision making is possible when linked to 
stakeholder theory by two dependentt variables:  
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 Time 
 Costs 
’Time’ is in the model understood in two ways: 
 Chronological time (calendar time) 
 Relational time (past, present and future) 
’Costs’ are in this model also understood twofold: 
 Economic costs (in terms of finance) 
 Relational costs (in terms of social and environmental consequences of 
the changes made by decisions) 
Now one may think that these two categories assume that of ’rational choice’ where both 
phenomena has to be as minimum as possible – au contraire.  The model shows 
how ’time’ and ’costs’ are tidily connected to the values and qualities of ’ethics’ as well as 
it incorporates the features of ’power’ and ’legitimacy’ and ’urgency’ as well as many 
other features in the multi-complexities of human interaction, means and ends, products 
and outcome et cetera. In this respect ’time’ and ’costs’ can be both limited and 
expanded in the mixture of ’garbage can’-processes and ’organic’ systems for adaption to 
environmental change and fluidity. While the ’rational’ ideal of every complex issue 
were – for the decision maker – that ’time’ and ’cost’ limitations were eroded away as 
dependent variables so that problems had all the ’time’ and unlimited ’costs’ to be solved 
inside. This is the contraire obligation in most situations of life. In organizations – any 
kind of assemblage of humans in a structured or loose coupled group with defined or 
loose coupled tasks and merits – almost every issue, problem or project has a 
limited ’time’ and ’costs’ allocated for the task at stake. And the decisions to be made 
inside these boundaries are often to be made on unclear preferences, fluid participation 
(Cohen et al. 1972), changing environments (Burns and Stalker 1961), limited or 
irrational use of knowledge (March 1994), limited allocated ressources et cetera 
and ’rational’ thinking decision makers as many humans want to perceive themselves 
and the ideal decisions they want to make in ’irrational’ circumstances characterized 
with different layers of ’powers’ (and legitimacies, which I also consider as a variant 
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of ’power’) inflicting the choices. In the next definitions contained within the ’Organic 
Stakeholder Model’ it is showet how ’time’ and ’costs’ as dependent variables 
expresses ’ethics’ in decision making processes.  
’Stakeholders’ has in this model an overall perpetuative role as the problem or risk holder 
and the decision influencers (Freeman 1984, 2010). For this role I do not distinguish 
between primary or secondary stakeholders, nor do I distinguish between their levels of 
influence by categorizing them into schemata of ’power’, ’legitimacy’ and ’urgency’, - the 
importance of stakeholders - because other models have concentrated on this specific 
categorization. By ’problem’ or ’risk’ holder I see stakeholders as the various individuals 
that are affected by a problem or holds a risk connected to the organization, which holds 
an ’energy’ to them that has exceeded the equilibrium of concern such that attention is 
now paid to these problems or risks in order to make certain actors act and change the 
situation, so that the problem can be solved and equilibrium reattained.  
And by ’decision influencers’ I see stakeholders – not as egalitarian actors having similar 
influence, but as influencers, that manage to impact decisions in the process of decision 
making with more or less weight according to the problem and risks they hold. 
’Problems’ are in this model defined as uncertainties, issues or impacts, that has reached 
an amount of energy attached to them that cannot be ignored at the time being because of 
the threat against survival eventually. If an organization reaches a point where 
production costs exceedes the revenue of the sale, the organization have to make 
changes to adapt to the market situation in order survive eventually, or close as in Burns 
and Stalkers (1961) investigation. Or if an organization do not change the actions in a 
specific way, penalties will be made, and eventually the organization will not survive 
after a certain amount of time. Some problems are not as essential for the survival or 
death of the organization – most problems are small problems that take place as a 
normal task in the organization, and who could take place at any time of importance. But 
if we assumed that no problems were solved at all in an organization, a point of no 
return would be reached eventually and the question of survival and death be present. 
Problems are normally solved according to their importance whether the actions taken 
is part of an ’anarchistic’ model such as the ’garbage can’ model or any other kinds of 
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organizations. This is due to Cohen et al.’s and March’s specifications (Cohen et al. 1972, 
March 1994) of the ’energy’ it takes to solve problems, where some problems have 
little ’energy’ attached to them and are easy and quick to solve, while others have a 
heavy load of ’energy’ attached to them and takes more time, ressources and costs to be 
solved. But essential to problems are, that no problems arise for no reason and by no 
one or no thing. The ’rational’ reason may not be present at the moment of the problem 
appears, and that is why ’knowledge’ is important for actors to understand the problem 
and to solve it. ’Irrational’ problems can also arise as well as ’irrational’ choices, where 
the knowledge and rationality is very limited, but in the case where means and ends are 
related to ’power’ comes into play, which is emphazised in other stakeholder models 
than this, ’irrational’ choices to one decision maker can be the ’rational’ choice of a 
superior. In this model ’problems’ are always attached to a receiver or a sender – here I 
attache them to the stakeholders. Problems are sent from somewhere and someone, 
who either has a problem or will receive another problem if the specific problem is not 
solved. The stakeholders that are interested in decision making have a stake in the 
problem in one way or the other (Freeman 1984, 2010), either they are employees 
working for the company to earn money to pay for their living or they can have many 
reasons to have a stake in the actual problem or issue. If a potential stakeholder does not 
have a stake in the problem, he or she will not use their ’energy’ in either decision 
making or claims, demands or pay attention to the problem. A problem or issue can also 
be attached to ’stakeholders’ that do not have a voice themselves. For instance the 
natural environment, the climate, the animals, the poor, the disabled etc. – there are 
many problems and issues that do not have a voice or is not heard by the voice they 
have, and therefore these ’stakeholders’ normally have a spokesperson or spokes-
organizations to represent them. Some stakeholder models regards ”the environment” 
or ”the climate” etc. as ’stakeholders’ themselves although the lack of direct voice 
(Woodward 2002) but the evidence of undesired changes as a ’voice’, but in this model 
all these voice-less entities are assumed to have a spokesperson in the shape of a human 
being or an organization to represent it. Other models regard ”the environment” 
and ”the climate” as ’issues’ themselves (Freeman 2010), but this model does in this 
instance distinguish between the entity itself represented by a spokesperson and the 
problems attached to it.    
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’Risks’ are defined in the model as the amount of uncertainties and unknown impacts one 
is willing to accept when taking a decision and making a choice. This amount can be 
divided in to types with intersection: 
1) Known or imagined risks 
2) Residual risk (intersection of 1) and 3)) 
3) Unknown risks 
 
 
 
The first type can be rationally estimated using calculations or measures of 
consequences of harm and probabilities, but still it does not ”do-away” with all kinds of 
risks (March 1994). The rational way of dealing with risk is mapping all possible 
knowledge from all possible and imagined interactions into a mathematical schemata 
and estimate the level of the known risks and estimation actions that can reduce these 
risks (see Figure 3). There is still an amount of unknowable risk also when actors 
rationally make choices in order to reduce risks. This ’residual’-risk overlaps the 
known/imagined and estimated risks with the unknown risks. The unknown risks is not 
uncountable and un-cognitively possible to estimate, because everything we know or 
can imagine is put in the first and managable category. The unknown is cognitively 
inattainably, but still this is risks that we are aware that can happen, but we do not know 
them before we experience them for the first time. In this part of the risk-model together 
with the residual risks – the risk that we could not eliminate after estimating the known 
risks and taking actions to reduce their probability, we can also call ”risk-taking” (March 
1994). Whenever a decision is made and implemented and made actionable and put into 
action, the residual risks and the unknown risks can occur as a consequence of the 
decisions, we have made. Only after seeing the consequences of our decisions and 
actions allocated to these, we can experience and make sense out of what happened 
(Weick 1995).  
Known  Unknown 
Re
si 
du
al 
Figure 3 RISK-types 
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’Ethics’ are in this model attached to the consequences of the outcome of the decisions 
made. It is also in this model attached to the unspecified and individual understanding of 
terms as ’behaviour’, ’quality’ and ’value’. Ethics in this sense are not defined a priori to 
the outcome, since the notion of ’ethics’ as well as ’behaviour’, ’quality’ and ’value’ is all 
attached to the impacts of the outcome. When taking ’ethical’ decisions different norms, 
values, moral considerations come into play, and these definitions are not possible to 
make exhaustively a priori. Some ethical implications are stated regulatively in the 
legislation, others are connected to customs, perceived or written norms, religious or 
cultural behavioural moral considerations etc. and it would take an entire thesis to 
explain what ’ethics’ means in specific contextural frameworks. Therefore, the notion 
of ’ethics’ in this model is relevant to stay open to the specific contextual, cultural and 
religiuos norms, values and morals present at the specific times and settings. Is ’ethics’ 
a ’rational’ thing? As long as ethics are part of an agreement stated as a written text – be 
that of legislation, religious books, normative scripts approved by an authority of any 
kind etc. I will see it as ’rational’ in the way, that enough people have voluntary agreed, 
that these ethics are worth considering. But when this said, there are lots of discussions 
among academia, professionals and practicians about what is the ”right” ethics to use. 
Some norms of behaviour is considered ethical in some parts of the world while 
considered unethical in other parts of the world, for example religious matters of ethics. 
This paper does not take any action in these discurses, but regards ’ethics’ as a notion 
connected to an agreed and ”rightful” ’behaviour’, ’qualities’ and ’values’ solely 
understood in the present context of matter. 
’Decisions’ are in this model defined as choices that are made to stabilize certain amounts 
of uncertainties, and that are difficult or takes a certain amount of energy to reverse – or 
are irreversably eventually. For example when a decision is made to buy a new set of 
trains for the nation, following decisions of producing them and the outcome of the 
actually product cannot be reversed, only destructed, reused etc. The outcome of the 
materiality cannot enter the same conditions as it were prior to the production of the 
new set of trains. If the nation refuses to receive the ordered trainsets because of 
unsatisfaction with the outcome, the trains cannot dissappear or be reversed to 
steelbars, organic oil-products (which plastic is made of) etc. It will always be something 
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else. Resold, destructed, re-used etc. Some decisions can be reversed if no outcome or 
impact has been executed yet at the time of changed decision. These reversabilities can 
be made in order of energy necessary to reverse the decision. Sometimes it takes little 
energy such as different parties meeting at a specific place and agreement of reversing 
the decision can be made quickly with little amount of energy, other times the 
reversability takes more energy to ”undo” or the outcome may be changed as well but in 
a way that the impact has no relevant or indifferent weight to the already made outcome. 
’Outcome’ is defined by the impact of the change that the decision and actions attached to 
have created. An outcome is always attached to at change which is attached to actions 
made for providing the change based on a decision made by someone. Only after the 
outcome has become reality, people can understand what change has happened based 
on what actions linked to what decisions and see what impact it has done. As Weick has 
put it – ”How can I know what I think untill I see what I say?” (Weick 1979), meaning that 
we can only understand the consequences of our actions (based on our deliberate 
decisions or our unconsciousness) which leads to the next step in the model and the last, 
the ’sensemaking’, which is seen retrospectively upon an action taken after a decision 
has been made consciously or unconsciously. 
’Sensemaking’ is in this model derived directly of Karl E. Weick’s work (1995). In this 
respect it is the last definition in the model leading to the ongoing organic ’cycle’ of the 
stakeholder model, where actions and outcomes (consequences) are interpreted by 
stakeholders and decision makers leading to new decisions, maybe new problems as 
seen in the ’garbage can’ model, or solutions, that had various characteristica, that either 
turns our attention into other problems to solve or continues the process in the same or 
derived directions as the one, we were in before. Weick (1995) says that ’sensemaking’ 
can only be retrospectively, and hereby he means, that – as Soeren Kirkegaard  
articulated back in 1843 – life can only be interpreted retrospectively, but must be lived 
forwardly (Thielst 1994) – that we interpret the actions we (or others) made in the past, 
not while we live them out.  
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This leads us to the expression of the model and to discuss the correlation between the 
entities explained above and the correlation with ’ethics’ and the dependent variables 
of ’time’ and ’costs’.  
The ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ comprises from the above the terms of stakeholders, 
problems, risks, decisions, outcomes and sensemaking. And the shared link between them 
is ethics consisting of the dependent variables of time and costs which finally expresses 
how ’ethics’ are connected to the decision making when involving stakeholders in this 
decision making. 
Throughout the definitions of the seven categories within the model, we see how the 
dependent variables are explained by extract from the definitions: 
 
Figure 2 The Organic Stakeholder Model 
Ethics depending on ’Time’ 
The dependent variable of ’time’ in the central notion of ’Ethics’ is apparent in the way 
that problems enter the decision making process by stakeholders either inside or 
outside the organization. The ’sender’ or the ’receiver’ of the problem or derived 
problems of decision making are characterized by stakeholders. And from the definition 
of a problem attached to a stakeholder we saw how ’time’ was linked to ’energy’ load, 
Ethics 
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and that problems arises when the ’energy’-load has reached a point and time, where 
something has to be done in order to avoid ethical issues like ’harm’ or in order 
to ’survival’ and the avoidance of ’death’ or the collapse of the organizations or the lives 
of the stakeholders. The problems may enter the decision makers table long before a 
disaster is present, even so early that no sign of a potential problem is visible. But if risks 
of the problem are perceived viable, problems may be attempted to be solve long before 
they ever occur as real problems. In this relation we see ’time’ as ’relational’. Either to 
prevent a disaterous future from coming to real or to avoid some consequences, that 
might happen. In ’relational time’ people use their knowledge from prior experiences 
either of their own or by the awareness of other similar situations experienced and 
described by others. So in order to prevent certain problems coming to real in the future, 
the knowledge and experiences from the past is used deliberately to solve problems 
imagined or calculated (estimated) before evidence from them appears. Some term this 
as being pro-active. ’Time’ has two kinds of features in this model – chronological and 
relational. Chronological time is used for instance when a timetable is made for a specific 
problem to be solved and decisions and products have to be created in order to solve the 
problem. Relational time is when decisions are made from our experiences or 
knowledge in order to prevent problems to occur, for instance when doing a risk-
calculation or –estimation. Then we imagine risks that might occur when valueing 
different path to go by our decision making. We use sensemaking to interpret our 
experienced actions and consequences of them, and we value them in terms 
of ’ethical’ ’qualities’ such as ”good”, ”balanced”, ”harmful” etc. Risk-management is 
mainly perceived as valueing risks taken if certain decisions are made prior to decision 
making. We want to estimate to what level ”harm” to others and ourselves is probable 
and what courses we have to take to avoid ”harm”. We could imagine business doing 
these risk-calculations in order to enhance utilitarian goals, but most times managers 
consider risks both outside and inside their organizations because they are aware of 
risks affecting stakeholders probably will harm our organization as well. For example 
harm done to customers from their buying a specific good will lead to certain penalties 
to the organization sooner or later. Of course some utilitarians or domination 
speculating managers can dictate harm to others, but these kinds of motives are not 
considered in this model. The model assumes that managers care about and have ethical 
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purposes in their decision making, and this model wants to show how this is dependent 
on ’time’ as well as ’costs’ – both situational (chronological time and financial costs) and 
relational (past, present and future time and social or environmental consequences). 
’Time’ – or ’timing’ has a special ’value’ or ’quality’ related to ’ethical’ decision making 
and stakeholder relationships. A sound and ’ethical’ relationship with stakeholders calls 
for a specific need for taking the right decisions according to problems resolutions as 
specific points of ’time’. If decisions are made after or to late according to specific 
consequences of a problem or decisions, the results are that ’energy’ attached to a 
specific problem does not end with the elimination of the problem – which I also 
called ”neutralizing”, but that new and additional ’energy’ will be attached to the 
problem, and the ’energy’ necessary to solve the problem ex post is much higher or has 
more heavy load than problems solved ”in time”. For exampel when France resisted to 
stop nuclear testing in 1995, a worldwide boycot of French products made counter-
pressure to this decision, and afterwards it took a long time before demands for French 
goods were near the same level as before. Some claims that it has never been the same 
after this political mistake – especially not in Denmark (Bentzen and Smith 2001). In this 
specific case we see the clash of a real-time political decision making worldwide 
stakeholders relate to the past by their memory of the devastating pictures of the 
victims of the atom bombing in Japan in year and reacting throughout the future based 
on a decision of self-utilization of a nation, that forgot to imagine the consequences of a 
worldwide consumer and political boycot of French goods based on an un-ethical 
perceived decision. Stakeholders make sense retrospectively of actions made in the past, 
and they react to actions in the present by the meaning, they attach to the actions while 
deciding in the present and for the future expected consequences of their present 
actions (Weick 1995). 
Ethics depending on ’Costs’ 
This example leads us to describe the other dependent variable of ’ethics’ namely ’costs’ 
– financial and relational (social and environmental consequences). As we saw in the 
former variable of ’time’, the two different notions of costs are often interlinked the 
same way. Financial costs ordered to solve a given problem also have consequences of 
relational costs. Problems are solved ideally in order to ”do-away” with them or 
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neutralize them, and some problems cannot do without financial costs attached to them, 
while other can be solved by posing an apology or explain ones own behaviours to the 
one, that has been harmed from a certain action (March 1994). The problems regarded 
in the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ are the ones, that have attached both financial costs 
as well as relational costs to them. When a problem is posed in organization and have to 
be solved as a kind of ’project’, they often have a certain amount of ’energy’ attached to 
them, which means that in order to solve the problem in order to neutralize the 
problems and minimize the relational costs, it often needs a financial cost budget to do 
the proper decision making in order to deliver actions or remedies to solve the 
problems. The examples investigated in this paper all have these preferences attached to 
them, but they are solved very differently – from pure ’rational’ or ’resolveable’ manners 
to ’oversight’ and ’flight’ manners such as seen in the ’garbage can’ model (Cohen et al. 
1972). Typically for these kinds of problems, multiple stakeholders have an interest in 
the decision making process and the consequences of the actions posed ex post decision 
making, and the ’ethical’ decision making involves inclusion of various stakeholders or 
debates around what it takes to neutralize the problem in order to satisfy a certain 
amount of stakeholders eventually. The problem is not a stand-alone in these kinds of 
projects, many juxtaposed problems arise when making decisions, and all problems 
have to be dealt with either directly or indirectly according to the risk, they contain. 
Often a certain amount of financial costs has been agreed allocated to the resolvement of 
the problem as well as a certain amount of time available to solve the problem in. But as 
we will see from the examples, these boundaries might be fixed, but may during the 
decision making process be negotiated with multiple stakeholders. And sometimes the 
stakeholders have what Mitchel et al. (1997), Wartick and Wood (1998) and Fassin 
(2009, 2010) and others adresses as certain and crucial amounts of power, legitimacy 
and urgency to stretch these boundaries of ’time’ and ’costs’. Sometimes determinant 
stakeholders such as the authorities, regulators or politicians pose demands, that affects 
the problem either to have allocated more financial costs and time in order to solve it 
satisfying to these stakeholders. Other times stakeholders have to obey determinant 
stakeholders and live with decisions, that creates certain relational costs and perhaps 
financial costs to their interests. For exampel when a new road is decided in the city 
council, it is affecting land- and property owners, who are forced to move out of their 
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houses with financial compensation from the society, if their properties lie in the 
geophysical area decided for the new road. The powers of these political, legislative or 
regulative stakeholders are stated by law, and whether property owners like the 
decisions or not, they have to obey these decisions, which they are compensated for. In 
these cases the implicated stakeholders often argue about the balance between the 
relational costs and the received financial costs, because the ’values’ and ’qualities’, they 
have lost might represent a misbalance in the view of the ’victim’ of this specific political 
decision. In other cases decisions are more flexible to various stakeholder demands of 
various ’energies’ (powers, legitimacies and urgencies) and solutions are sought to 
balance these energies to satisfy as many stakeholder demands as possible. In the latter 
situation of a certain amount of flexibility in decision processes, ’ethics’ may be more 
fluid and at the same time as certain amounts of ’ethics’ are stated in the legislation, 
other amounts of ’ethics’ might be negotiated in the decision making process by the 
inclusion of various stakeholders and transparency in motives, means and ends in the 
decision making process (Pedersen 2006). For example typical kinds of legislations 
concerned about the ’interests of the public’ allows public service actors by law to 
decide and solve problems the ’best way’ as we saw in the example with planning of a 
new road. ’Ethics’ are typically built into the legislation of how implicated stakeholder 
have to receive financial compensations for the costs, the project applies to them. But 
the legislation does not indicate how and where the road should be placed and which 
public concerns the project should consider. In this respect the ’ethical’ decisions of the 
planner comes into play. Maybe ’rational’ reasons to place the road a specific place 
considers the benefit of the many roadusers, but other times ’ethics’ of individual 
consideration comes natural. For exampel if the roadplanning removes the livelihood of 
small shopkeepers and no ’ethical’ alternative place for these shops can be provided, the 
road planner might consider ’ethics’ for both the roadusers and the single shopkeepers 
in a way, that the shops are preserved and the physical place of the road is considered 
for the adaption of both individual and public interests. The problems of these complex 
projects such as the construction of roads and other infrastructure is that decisions of 
allocated costs and time is often decided prior to the final design of the project – 
especially if the project is politically decided. Financial costs and time schedules may be 
fixed seemingly, but a vast example of public construction processes proves, that both 
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budgets and time is typically exceeded in the end (Kreiner 2009) because of unforeseen 
events, claims, demands etc. that were unknown at the time of decision making, or 
worse – decisions made on a wrong basis. 
Coherence of the model  
The coherence of the model and especially the term of how ’ethics’ perpetuates 
the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ is visualized by a basic schemata in which cases can be 
described in to create the specific and concrete coherence adaptable for each individual 
case: 
 
Figure 3 'Ethics' as dependent on 'time' and 'costs' 
The above illustration in Figure 5 aims to show how ’ethics’ can be explained by 
dependent variables such as ’time’ (chronological and relational) and ’costs’ (financial 
and relational (social)). The horisontal black line contains the twofold notion of ’time’, 
while the vertical black line contains the twofold notion of ’costs’ in a kind 
of ”coordination” system. The diagram never ”meets” as a normal mathematical 
coordinate system would do, and this is because the model wants to illustrate the 
flexibility of each axis, and to avoid speculating in ’negative’ outcomes historically in the 
first place. The idea is that in this ’system’ two graphs will be shown according to the 
two terms – an ”absolute” blue line in the upper quadrant measuring the concrete 
chronological ’time’ and the financial ’costs’ passing by, and a ”relative” red line in the 
lower quadrant illustrating the relative time (the perceived or sensemaking of the past, 
 29 
the interactions within the present and the imagination of the future) and the relative 
costs (social and environmental costs measured in perceived ’values’ of importance). 
The letters in circles illustration which determinant decisions were made during the 
process, and the last letter indicates the outcome of the project illustration when 
the ”absolute” investment of ’time’ and ’costs’ meets the ”relative” solution of the project, 
which afterwards can be interpreted and made sense of before the ’Organic Stakeholder 
Model’ circle stops or continues. The ”coordinate” system is the same in all cases, but the 
blue and red line varies dynamicly with the problem at stake. 
The circularity of the OSM (Figure 4) is deliberate, because it illustrates in general terms 
how this process can be an ongoing feature or how it develops and generates new 
problems, that follows the same pattern. The ”coordinate” system (Figure 5) shall be 
imagined as part of the ’Ethical core’ of the OSM. 
Empirical evidence of the OSM 
The six cases from projects executed in two different Danish water companies shows 
how ’ethical’ decision making - involving several stakeholders in the decision making as 
well as listening to voices of weak stakeholders as well – depends on the proper 
allocation or flexibility of ’time’ and ’costs’, and how this eventually becomes a business 
case for the water companies. The tabel 1 in the appendix 1 shows the different 
premises of the six cases. 
The six cases are all different, but at the same time, they share the same ’qualities’ 
and ’values’ as part of their ’ethical’ decisions. The cases have all been extremely 
complex, and the very few determinant decisions were extracted out of hundreds of 
decisions during each process on the basis of, that these specific and well chosen 
decisions had crucial impact on the ’ethics’ and the feasibility and completion of the 
projects. If ’ethics’ were drawn out of these projects, there had not been a project – only 
unsolved problems. 
To analyze how the ’ethics’ dependent on the variables of ’time’ and ’costs’, we will 
regard six Time/Cost-frameworks of the projects. The interesting part of the analysis is 
the letters in circles, that denotes the determinant ’ethical’ decisions, that made the 
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project able to be solved. The blue line shows the financial costs during the 
chronological time in absolute terms, and the red line shows the stakeholders definition 
of social costs in relative value-terms. The evolvement and combination of the blue and 
red line shows how stakeholder involvement in ethical decision making makes the 
outcome of the project eventually. If stakeholders were not heard or involved, the 
problem would have been unsolved or the outcome would have generated new 
problems. We also see how fixed financial costs and chronological time was not possible 
for the completeness of the project in many of the cases. Every time the blue line jumps 
up, a decision is made to extend both financial costs and chronological time in order to 
meet stakeholder demands and to complete the project in an ethical manner to satisfy 
the many before the few. 
Odense Port 
 
Figure 6 Odense Port 
   
Decision (A) recognizes the problem of an open wastewater basin in a suburb called 
Tarup, that has been present for many years but unsolveable as a Gordian Knot because 
of lack of possibilities to dig in a densely urbanized area. Now techniques of tunnelling 
becomes possible and to close this open, un-environfriendly basin is decided. Soon after 
decision (a) is made, the City Council decides in (b) to develop the port of Odense from 
an industrial area into a recreative area with the possibility to swim in the Channel of 
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Odense eventually. This means that a political pressure for the water company to 
eliminate two wastewater outlets from the port/channel in order to realize these urban 
plans, and the financial costs and timeschedule rises in decision (c). The project is now 
developed to a gigant pipeline basin of 11,000 m3 in a partnering with an entrepreneur, 
the developer and a consultant, and the details of the initial project showed, that the 
tracé of the project was impossible to follow around a protected forest. The only 
possible way to put the pipeline is through the forest. The price is slightly increased in 
decision (d). When the forest protection agencies (municipal and state authorities) and 
several environmental protection NGOs hears about this decision, their claims and 
demands towards the project shows, that the new tracé has devastating social costs to 
the 300 years old forest, that in this design would have to be cut irreparable in their 
minds. They decided in (e) not to allow this design, and a nearby collapse in design was 
present. At this specific chronological time, a quarter of the project was already installed, 
and a major redesign-phase began. A time-out in decision making was allowed while the 
design was changed for a new political decision making process. It was possible to make 
only half of the project around the Port of Odense, but if the design were not re-adjusted 
in Tarup, this initial part of the project would remain unsolved as in the beginning – the 
Gordian Knot was still unsolved. After a while, the new design was made possible 
through a deep tunneling under the forest, and this decision had to increase both 
financial costs and time spent at the project. The politician decided in (f) that the project 
could be solved with the new design, that meant that the price for water delivery and 
wastewater collection for customers must be increased in order to pay for this redesign. 
The forest protection authorities and NGOs were satisfied, and the social costs were now 
to be eliminated finally. The outcome (g) was a project, that not only satisfied politicians, 
authorities and NGOs, but also had a very ’ethical’ touch on every smaller problem 
solved for any other impacted stakeholder during the entire process, and made a story 
of ’first mover’ in the water sector branch of how to solve complex and seemingly 
insolveable problems in a densely built urban area. 
Dalum 
The above project showed the way for this specific water company to solve other 
projects of the same complexity by the knowledge created in the Odense Port project. All 
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evidence of good and ’ethical’ project design for this similar project in another suburb 
was used to tunnel a basin pipeline under a protected forest with outlet into a protected 
river. Now, in the very first design, all relevant stakeholders as nature protection 
authorities, NGOs, land- and houseowners as well as politicians were involved from the 
beginning. Therefore we see a more smooth and ethical decision making process in this 
project: 
 
Figure 7 Dalum 
The project is acknowledged in decision (a) with a preliminary design. From this point 
all stakeholders – both determinant and others – were involved in the decision making 
process either in the direct design of the pipeline or as hearing parts for this design. 
When the design was agreed with all relevant stakeholders including the decision 
making politicians in (b), the final timeschedule and fixed chronological time and 
financial costs were possible without further negotiations. The stakeholders continued 
to define and refine the final design according to technical demands, and from (c) all 
problems were solved to every determinant stakeholder’s satisfactions, and the 
concretization of the project made a complex project uncomplicated for the desired 
outcome in (d). 
This process were also seen in another project, where creativity in planning and design 
was necessary and the full involvement of determinating stakeholders crucial for the 
completion of a new project in another suburb of Sanderum.  
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Sanderum 
The problem in this area were due to several happenings of extreme stormrain events 
molesting 9 houses in Sanderum. The houses were placed in the bottom of a hilly area, 
and water did assemble in this natural geophysical ”hole”. The initial phase of project 
design (a), no less than 15 designs were considered with variable, but expensive costs. 
The 9 houseowners, the owners union, the natural protection and environmental 
authorities of the municipality of Odense were all involved in the decision making 
process, but suddenly an idea of one participant made the ’turn’ (b): Why not buy all 9 
houses since this is where the stormrain ends and build a large rainwater reservoir in 
this particular area? This was a very controversial suggestion, but when it was 
calculated it showed that not only would this suggestion buy the houseowners free of 
their problems for half the financial costs of the 15 other suggestions, it was also 
possible to design the reservoir to reduce the risk of new flooding from 1:10 per year to 
1:50 per year. The stakeholders needed extended time to agree of this decision, because 
it was crucial to them how much compensation they got from selling their houses to the 
water company. Finally the prices was negotiated satisfying and 7 out of 9 houseowners 
agreed to sell their houses and move out a year after the agreement in order to have 
time to find a new house or even build a new one another place (c). The final outcome 
(d) was made in cooperation with the remaining houseowners and the union of owners 
in the area to make the new water reservoir a natural perle for social purposes as well 
as technical. 
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Figure 8 Sanderum 
The next case is very different from the three above, but the time/cost dependencies are 
shown to be just as viable as in the above. 
Ryttermarken 
The merger of a water- and wastewater company in Svendborg with the municipal 
waste section necessitated a new building for more room for offices, canteen and 
meeting facilities to complete the merger in decision (a). What seemed to be a 
traditional construction of a new building turned out to be a struggle of conflicting 
stakeholder demands, that was sought solved in a ”democratic” process. This process 
continued during the design untill decision (b) was made, but as we can imagine from 
the development of the red line, the needs of the stakeholders – primarily the employees 
– initiated several conflicts, even a riot, that had to be solved during the design phase. 
After this process, that made the financial costs and chronological time expand to meet 
all the needs arised in the ”democratic” design process, the building had the built in idea 
of ’ethical’ energy project of reduction of fossile energy and substituting this with ”green” 
energy from geothermal and solar thermal heating as well as solar cells to produce 
electricity for the entire property housing the administration and operation facilities of 
the new water and waste company in Svendborg. Unfortunately the project had several 
end-problems, that resulted in a new mini-riot, since failures in the construction made 
air of sewer odor, cold and heat problems occur after the commissioning of the new 
building. Luckily these problems were solved after a while, but these problems had an 
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effect a long time after the project had been finished, and it overruled the ethical results 
of the energy neutral building in the first place in the employees minds.     
 
Figure 9 Ryttermarken 
The last two projects have comparable characters, since they are experimental and have 
a potential not only to solve a problem, but to create ’ethical’ benefits in the long run 
both financial and of social costs eventually. 
STAR and Lunde 
The projects in the table are the smallest projects of the assembled examples in this 
paper, but their efficiencies are worth mentioning and how ’ethical’ decision making 
involving stakeholders can result in a business case not only ethically but also financially.  
 
 
Figure 10 STAR energy optimization in 3 WWTPs Figure 11 Pressure optimization in water delivery 
Without detailing the decision making processes now, we see in both projects how 
an ’ethical’ and ’business-case’ idea of reducing energy in processes of 3 wastewater 
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treatment plant (WWTP) as well as in the water delivery can not only solve problems, 
but also make the social costs turn into a business case of financial gain where the red 
line crosses the timeline – meaning that social costs now become social gains or benefits 
for both the climate and the financial bottomline as reduced or in this line as ”reversed 
costs”.  
Discussion and implications 
The ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ contains in no way and exhaustive explanation of how 
problems are solved in everyday lives of organizations. As mentioned before it 
acknowledges the ideas of who are the most determinant stakeholders and who gets 
more influence than others in the way the power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchel et al. 
1997, Wartick and Wood 1998) is implicated in this model as well. What it also seeks to 
contribute with or do away with is, which Fassin mentions, the staticness of many 
stakeholder models trying to systemize stakeholders into rigid categories in unflexible 
systems. Fassin shows how some categories are sustainable enough though possible to 
elaborate, which he does in his categorization of different stakeholder-types such as 
stakeholders, stakekeepers and stakewatchers and lately his borrowed notion from 
Holzer of stakeseekers (Holzer 2008, Fassin 2009, 2010). These categorizations are also 
possible to use in combination with the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’, since this wants to 
show how variables such as ’time’ and ’costs’ are linked to the ’ethics’, which Freeman 
adresses is the most prominent feature of stakeholder theory (Freeman 2010), 
adressing ’quality’ and ’value’ and bringing this into play by adressing stakeholder 
relationships others that stockholders. 
When this is said, the weaknesses of the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ is that it offers no 
simple or unified solutions to the art of how to work with stakeholders. It reckognizes 
what Pedersen found crucial for a good stakeholder relationship, which includes terms 
as inclusion, openness, tolerance, empowerment and transparency (Pedersen 2006), but it 
does not predict that if decision makers use the ideas of the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’, 
that then a specific outcome will be possible. It does not protect against what March 
showed us from the ’garbage can’ model of decision making, that if problems are solved 
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with ’oversight’ and ’flight’, then problems are not really solved anyway. It does not take 
the responsibility of the decision makers out of their hands. 
What the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’ offers is a way of ’ethical’ mindset to decision 
makers in their considerations of the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the 
decision making process and how they can benefit from that process if allowed some 
flexibility in the dependent variables of ’time’ and ’costs’ and how some problems may 
be overcomed by these investments eventually. The model is no short-cut to easier 
decision making processes, but it hopes to contribute with a more ’ethical’ decision 
making process that eventually can develop a business case both financially and socially. 
Conclusion and Perspectives 
The above qualitative study of 6 cases from mega-projects (and problems) to small 
projects in two Danish water companies shows us how ’ethical’ decision making 
depends on two crucial variables such as ’time’ – chronologically and relationally – 
and ’costs’ – financial and social. Whether decision making processes are more ’rational’ 
or ’garbage can’-like, these examples shows, that in order to avoid what March 
exemplified, that problems solved by ’oversight’ and ’flight’ did not really solve anything, 
the above example shows, that indeed the ’garbage can’ model of decision making is very 
true while problematic, and if these complex problems are to be solved, decision makers 
must invest in elasticity in ’time’ and ’costs’ to provide ’ethical’ decisions and to solve 
seemingly unsolvable problems. This is what Burns and Stalker showed that ’organic’ 
systems can do more effectively than ’mechanic’, and that is why the above is part of 
the ’Organic Stakeholder Model’. The necessity to include stakeholders in both 
determinant level (Mitchel et al. 1997, Wartick and Wood 1998) as well as other levels 
during the process and to value the ’ethics’ by flexibility in ’time’ and ’costs’ in this 
inclusion and transparency in decision making (Pedersen 2006) can be the way to solve 
complex problems eventually with the maximum commitment of all relevant 
stakeholders to the project design (Kreiner 2009). When ’time’ and ’cost’ are fixed in an 
unflexible way, the outcome will be framed by this fixation and the result dependent on 
what is possible inside the rigidness of this framework. But very few complex problems 
are fixed in ’time’ and ’costs’. As we saw, sometimes it is possible by the inclusion of 
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stakeholders in design of the solution to even reverse the financial costs as in the 
Sanderum case and the last two cases of energy reduction. In these cases it is possible to 
see a business case financial as well as social. 
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Appendix 1: The six cases of problems and ethics in decision making and the inclusion of stakeholders 
Name Problem Stakeholders 
(determinant) 
Stakeholders 
(others) 
Time 
(years) 
Costs 
(mio. €)  
Decisions 
(determ.) 
Risks Ethics 
Odense Port Environmental problem: 
 
Waste water outlet should be 
reduced to Odense Port and 
Channel and an open basin with 
waste water should be closed. In 
order to keep water pricing stable 
the time and costs are fixed. 
8 
 
The determinant 
stakeholders were 
authorities or 
politicians able to 
shut down the 
project. 
> 100 
 
Many other 
stakeholders were 
accom-modated or 
compensated 
during the process. 
> 4 years 
 
The first 
project 
were fixed 
to 2 years. 
27 
 
From: 
1) 5.3 
2) 21 
3) 22 
4) 27 
 
7 
 
The most 
determi-nant 
deci-sion were 
taken poli-
tically to raise 
time and costs. 
 
Only half or 
none of the 
solutions we-
re possible if 
the decisions 
were not 
taken. 
 
 
Environmen-
tal problems 
should be 
solved. The 
nature shall 
be preserved. 
Dalum Environmental problem: 
Waste water flooding threatened 
the area of Dalum and many 
house-owners. The only way to 
solve the problem was to tunnel a 
major pipeline basin with outlet 
to a river. Experiences from 
Odense Port were used. 
> 10 
 
The determinant 
stakeholders were 
authorities or 
politicians able to 
change decisions 
in the project. 
> 100 
 
Many other 
stakeholders were 
accom-modated or 
compensated 
during the process. 
3 years 
 
No change 
of the pro-
ject. Expe-
riences 
from the 
past. 
13 
 
From: 
1) 10 
2) 13 
4 
 
Determinant 
decisions were 
made prior to 
the politically 
accept this 
time. 
 
 
All demands 
from the > 10 
de-terminant 
stakehol-ders 
may change 
the project. 
 
 
Environmen-
tal problems 
should be 
solved. The 
nature shall 
be preserved. 
Sanderum Social problem: 
Rainwater flooding threatened 9 
house-owners to leave their 
houses for good if the reservoir 
were not en-larged. The problem 
was that the 9 houses were built 
in the very bottom of a hilly area, 
and there-fore the rain ended in 
the ground level of theses houses, 
which were molested twice with 
tonnes of water inside. 
11 
Most of the 
determinant 
stakeholders were 
the 7/9 
houseowners, the 
municipa-lity 
authority and the 
union of house-
owners in the area. 
They decidede the 
outcome on basis 
of risks. 
> 50 
All the other 
stakeholders got 
their pro-blems 
solved by the 
actions of the 7/9 
house-owners and 
the buil-ding of a 
large reservoir at 
the spot whe-re 
the 7 houses were 
placed before. 
3 years 
 
Time was 
es-sential 
to this 
project. 
The 9 
house-
owners 
needed 
time to 
commit to 
the 
solution 
4.5 
 
The 
costs 
were 
redu-
ced due 
to the 
ele-gant 
solu-
tion of 
the 
result 
4 
 
The most 
prominent 
decision was if 
the 7 house-
owners were 
willing to sell 
their houses to 
the water 
company to 
tear down. 
If this 
specific 
solution was 
not chosen, 
the possible 
reduce of 
risk were 
only 1:10. 
This solu-
tion made it 
possible to 
reduce the 
risk to 1:50 
year. 
Social costs 
are to be sol-
ved when 
lives or li-
ving are 
under threat. 
Creativity 
payed off and 
made a better 
solution than 
normally. 
Ryttermarken Room for employees: 
After a merger more space and a 
new building was necessesary to 
house the new collegues. At the 
same time the director wanted to 
implement an energy merger 
from fossile energy to ”green” 
energy to cover the needs of 
8 
The director and 5 
board- members of 
the company 
decide the 
premises and the 
design of the 
building and the 
> 50 
Mainly these other 
stake-holders 
came from the em-
ployees of the 
company, that had 
to merge with new 
collegues and 
2 years 
The first 
year of 
plan-ning 
and 
design, the 
second of 
the con-
1.33 
 
The 
price 
went 
from: 
1) 0.4 
2) 1.0 
The direc-tor 
insisted on 
invol-ving all 
em-ployees in 
the decisi-on 
making 
process in 
order to bring 
The risks of 
giving  
democra-tic 
voices to all 
was both 
free-ing and 
bounding. 
Noone knew 
The ethics of 
the in-
clusive-ness 
of all 
employe-es 
was a great 
step, but hard 
to control. 
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Name Problem Stakeholders 
(determinant) 
Stakeholders 
(others) 
Time 
(years) 
Costs 
(mio. €)  
Decisions 
(determ.) 
Risks Ethics 
administration and the operation 
workshops and garages.  
ener-gy project. 
The fire au-
thorities and the 
nature protection 
authority were 
involved 
move to other 
offices than their 
regular ones. Some 
neighbours were 
also involved. 
struc-tion 
of the 
building 
etc. 
3) 1.33 
because 
of more 
interest 
and 
ideas. 
all ideas to live. 
This  
”democra-
tization” made 
con-troverses 
flourish.  
who had the 
last word, 
and the 
direc-tor had 
to take riots 
seriously.  
Eventual-ly 
the ow-
nership to the 
new building 
was crea-ted 
a-mong all. 
STAR Energyreduction: 
This project was desig-ned to 
reduce energy, outlet of CO2 and 
additives from intelligent use of 
online-measure-ment in 3 
wastewater treatment plants. The 
estimates were, that after 10 
years the project in-vestments 
were depre-ciated and costs 
earned as saved money on ope-
ration of the plants. 
1 
 
The director of the 
water company 
had the final word 
in this experi-
mental case, where 
a con-sultant and 
process-sup-plier 
convin-ced him of 
the potential gain. 
> 10 
All employees at 
the waste-water 
treat-ment plants 
were involved as 
well as the 
operation ma-
nager and the 
project mana-ger. 
Employee 
accepted to change 
opera-tion also. 
2 years 
 
The pro –
ject was 
due to 
imple –
menta-tion 
of another 
project 
synerge-tic 
to this too. 
0.4 
The 
costs 
rose a 
little 
be-
cause of 
ad-ded 
needs 
to im-
prove 
operati
on. 
This pro-ject 
had two gains: 
To support the 
direc-tors 
visions of 
reducing 
energy and 
CO2 emis-sion 
and to solve 
pro-blems in a-
nother pro-ject 
too. 
If this pro –
ject was not 
accep –ted 
the other 
pro-ject of 
re-new a ba-
sin and to 
treat the 
wastewa-ter 
in only one 
half were im 
possible. 
The idea of 
redu-cing 
ener-gy not 
on-ly saves 
money, it also 
redu-ces CO2 
to the atmo-
sphere in 
order to 
mitigate the 
clima-te 
change. 
Lunde Presssure-problems: 
The project had to solve problems 
in a village, where pressure could 
not be obtained from a small 
waterwork. Therefore a re-
direction of water from a large 
waterwork of higher pressure 
made it possible to disconnect the 
small waterwork with the total 
result of reduced energy of 
50,000 kWh the first ¾ year. 
1 
 
The final word was 
the director’s, and 
his visions of 
energy reduc-tions 
while better 
service to the 
custo-mers where 
solved in an easy 
and gainful way.  
> 50 
 
No one had 
anything against 
getting better 
service, and every 
emplo-yee was 
plea-sed and sur-
prised by the 
energy-redu-cing 
effect this 
operation had 
3 month Very 
little. 
 
Bey-
ond 
com-
pari-
son. 
The direc-tor 
encou-raged 
his personel to 
be creative and 
to ex-periment 
with their 
ideas of de-
livering better 
ser-vice and to 
save energy. 
The risks 
were small, 
but acknow-
ledgeable 
because a 
risk of higher 
leakages 
appears 
when 
pressure is 
risen. Here 
too. 
The ethics of 
giving 
autonomy to 
staff in all 
seg-ments 
are ambitious 
and well 
conside-red. 
Em-ployee 
satisfacti-on 
rises as well. 
 
